A Reexamination of the War in Kosovo Essay

The Clinton Administration, a unyielding with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), was non completely effective in both identifying the concrete objectives relating to the Kosovo conflict and applying the multitude resources that were available to resolve that conflict. There are mevery reasons for this behind this inefficiency. First, in that respect was the general reluctance to get involved in the conflict, for more(prenominal) or less semi semi semipolitical reasons. Second, in that location was the constant in fighting and territorial battles organism waged within the legions structure.Third, there was the heavy pick out to mold media perception, which was perhaps withdraw in past wars. Lastly, there was the weakness of the host capability itself, near especially in legal injury of fighting a war at a lower place different weather conditions. The Four Factors The first eventor that hampered the efficient deed of the war in Kosovo was the general reluc tance of the Statesn leading, both civilian and phalanx, to get involved in the first place. There was a far-flung feeling that it was not the time for the States to be intervening actively in the affairs of a relatively small and un grievous carry in Eastern Europe.After all, what was there to be gained by implementing interventionist policies there? Back then, as now, the focus of galore(postnominal) political and forces planners was Israel and the lay East, the hotbed of the world perpetually in crisis. But there was at to the lowest degree a solid rationale for that preoccupation the Middle East was by far the magnanimousst supplier of oil in the world, and stability there was important to the energy supply and thus the overall growth of the U. S. economy.But what was to be gained in Kosovo, especially since much risk was to be undertaken in terms of the countrys resources, as salubrious as its prestige? American had failed to intervene in Rwanda and had been forced to a humiliating retreat in Somalia, and those bitter memories were still fresh in the minds of most Americans. In the Rwandan genocide, America drew heavy criticism from its allies and the world at large for its in put through in Somalia, America drew derision for its decision to biff out prematurely.Both the political and armed forces establishments suffered from these events, and they go outably wanted to debar a standardised occurrence from happening again. Getting involved in war in which there seemed so small-scale to gain was reprobation to many leaders at the time. The constant infighting within the American military and within NATO was the second circumstanceor that hampered the Kosovo operations. command Clark detailed many examples of his day-after-day battles with his civilian superiors, as well as his peers from within the military establishment.These incidents, quite obviously, detracted from the efficiency of the operations themselves. For instance, the exampl e of how the just about senior staff generals with political access prevented the effective use of Apache helicopters provides a sickening image of how generals on the ground can be obstructed by those who wield political violence. The constant fear that former(a) conflicts might erupt in the Persian Gulf and the Korean Peninsula was likewise an albatross that hung heavily over the collective necks of those involved in the Kosovo war.Allowing these fears to detract from the efficient prosecution of the war could subscribe to led to disaster under certain circumstances. The lack of cooperation was not limit to within the American military itself, but in NATO as well. Commanders of other nations were kn receive to disobey Clarks commands if these orders were interpreted as not being conducive to their respective strategic national interests. Yet, in a way, this was the least(prenominal) of Clarks problems, for the other allied nations played a lesser authority in the conflict in comparison with the U. S., with the possible exception of large(p) Britain. It was the problems caused by infighting within the army, as well as disagreements with Washington, that do world(a) Clarks tenure as SACEUR truly difficult. This perhaps can be attributed to the reality that political objectives and military objectives are rarely one and the same, and the fact that military leaders at the highest levels are rarely apolitical. The greater affair played by the media in American wars was also in full-display during the Kosovo conflict. eer since the Vietnam War, the U.S. had sh accept a marked distaste for any number of war casualties (This had dictated its research into unmanned and smart technologies. ) So much so, in fact, that the enemies of America had long viewed this is as the primary weakness of the nations military power. Indeed, this weakness has provided the most basic strategy of terrorist organizations today. They know for a fact that in terms of raw mil itary strength, they are inferior to the joined States. Thus, if they ever come under direct attack by the U. S. , their chances of achievement are slim.But if they can inflict just enough casualties (usually with guerilla tactics) and provoke it broadcast over the broadcast media in striking fashion, then public opinion might force U. S. forces to withdraw, as was the chance in Vietnam. It was under this same hope that Saddam Hussein stood unwilling against the United States in the last Iraq War. Lastly, there was the weakness within the military itself, especially in terms of being an all-terrain, all-weather capable fighting force. Many instances within the book and numerous statements made by General Clark point to the fact that the U.S. military is by no means an effective, all-weather conditions army. In fact, it seems as if the attainment of this goal is still a long way off, as has perhaps been underscored more recently by some of the maintenance problems encountered i n Iraq. Also, high levels of weapon technology have brought with them their own special perplex of problems, which could not have been foreseen but nevertheless need to be addressed as soon as possible. These include, among others, the gathering and by the way application of intelligence in order to use these weapons to their maximum effect.A lack of cross-understanding between the discordant military units also contributes to military weakness. In his concluding remarks in Waging Modern War, General Clark vocalises this In Kosovo my commanders and I name that we lacked the detailed prompt information to campaign effectively against the Serb ground forces. or so of the technologies we had been promoting since the Gulf War were still immature, unable to deal with the vagaries of weather, vegetation, and urban areas, or the limitations of bandwidth and airspace.The discrete service programs didnt always fit together technicallyThe officers who operated the programs were not qual ified to work across service lines and did not understand the full range of national capabilities. I worried about the nature of Joint skills even among senior officers. Of course, notwithstanding these four factors, the war was brought to a successful conclusion successful meaning that the combat operations against the forces of Slobodan Milosevic turn out effective enough to topple the regime of that ruler, and thereby remove the drift to the racial killings in that region.However, whether or not America achieved its true aims in the Balkans is more open to question, if indeed the Clinton Administration had a clear quite a little of what those aims were in the first place. The costs of that conflict, both tangible and intangible, must also be analyzed in order to avoid similar mistakes in the future. An Analysis of the Feasibility, Acceptability, and Suitability of the Military Action in Kosovo The concept of feasibleness closely ties in to the question Can it be done? With the eudaimonia of hindsight, we might say with complete assurance that yes, the military action undertaken in Kosovo was feasible.However, even without this particular benefit, the question of feasibility still would have been answered in the affirmative. There was perhaps no other military force in the world that could have undertaken the mission in Kosovo, and done so with success. regular before the campaign began, it was almost a forgone conclusion that American forces would prevail. It was hardly a matter of time, and though unforeseen setbacks would occur along the way, no one truly doubted the ultimate result. Addressing the question of acceptability is a little more complex, but may also be answered in the affirmative.At the time of the conflict, world opinion was crying out for America to do something about the killings under Milosevic. In many ways, the various nations comprising NATO and the U. N. pushed the U. S. into action. Internationally then, military action in K osovo was acceptable some might even say it was warranted, due to the role of the U. S. as the global policeman. The war was costly what war isnt? but it gained for the U. S. a level of prestige and credibility that it precise much needed after some decidedly embarrassing political problems.The effectiveness of the air campaign and General Clarks own doctrine of waging war (which de-emphasizes the use of ground troops) resulted in fewer casualties than might other than have been expected. This in itself was a potent testimony to American power and a reaffirmation of the high reputation already earned by the American military in the 1991 Gulf War. If the goal in Kosovo was to baulk the genocidal killings and bring Slobodan Milosevic to justice, then we can honestly say that military action was suitable.Some pundits may argue that diplomacy would have been a break choice, but they must be reminded that diplomatic methods were tried before any full-scale operations were conducted and diplomacy failed. With a hard-boiled tyrant much(prenominal) as Milosevic, who deliberately released wave upon wave of racial hate upon his own country, diplomacy could not possibly have a great effect. eve if diplomatic channels could have been used to stop the killings and this is doubtful they would have taken far too long to mobilize and would have in all likelihood ended up with little to show for it.Conclusion Despite many problems that were unforeseen (and perhaps unavoidable), the military action in Kosovo ended up attaining its major objectives. Still, the operation could have gone better, and more smoothly. In the future, if similar circumstances should come up, both political and military planners would do well to review the lessons learned in this conflict. First, a good amount of political will should be present, and directed at a clear set of pre-defined goals.Second, bickering and infighting within the military should be checked, reduced, and if possible el iminated. Third, all leaders involved in a conflict should be aware of how to manage media perceptions, especially in terms of obtaining continuing public support. Lastly, the capability of the military to wage war under all conditions should be improved and made the top priority of defense spending. When these four factors are improved to their various degrees, then the prosecution of future wars will decidedly become more efficient and effective.